India Between Moscow and the West: A Case of Convenient Commitments

By Umair Pervez Khan

India has recently warned its citizens not to join the Russian army in Ukraine, describing such involvement as “fraught with danger.” This came after reports that around 150 Indian nationals had enlisted in the Russian forces, with at least nine killed.

Many were later repatriated following Prime Minister Modi’s intervention with President Putin in Moscow. The families of the victims, however, accused the Indian government of being soft on travel agents who misled citizens with false promises of employment in Russia.

By distancing itself from its nationals who fought for Russia, New Delhi projects an image of adhering to international norms that prohibit mercenary activity. Yet this symbolic act stands in sharp contrast to India’s broader foreign policy approach.

While cautioning its citizens against direct involvement, India has expanded its imports of discounted Russian crude oil, blunting the impact of Western sanctions designed to constrain Moscow’s war effort.

It has also abstained repeatedly from United Nations votes condemning Russia’s blatant violations of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The contradiction is evident: India claims moral high ground on individual conduct but disregards systemic violations when economic or strategic benefits are at stake.

India’s defense policy further underscores this balancing act. Once heavily dependent on Moscow, India’s defense imports from Russia have declined from 70% to 36% in recent years. This deliberate diversification allows New Delhi to signal to Washington and Europe that it is not captive to Moscow’s orbit, even as it secures cheap Russian oil to meet immediate needs.

In effect, India avoids a visible rupture with Russia while quietly reducing Moscow’s long-term leverage over its security.

At the same time, India leverages its identity as the “world’s largest democracy” to bolster its global standing. It’s calls for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and its self-promotion as a “bridging power” between the Global South and major powers add to this image.

But this democratic rhetoric serves not just to boost its image, but it also functions as a tool to undermine China’s bid to lead the Global South. By contrasting its democratic identity with Beijing’s so-called authoritarian model, New Delhi appeals to both developing nations and Western capitals, presenting itself as a more credible and values-based partner.

Yet this projection is selective and opportunistic. India has shown little hesitation in partnering with authoritarian regimes when it suits its interests, from Myanmar and Bangladesh under Sheikh Hasina to Iran and Israel.

New Delhi’s silence on Israel’s excessive use of force in Gaza, which has killed thousands of Palestinians, stands in sharp contradiction to its claims of supporting human rights and international law.

More importantly, India’s domestic record of human rights and democratic norms undermines the very values it seeks to project abroad. The revocation of Article 370 in 2019, stripping Jammu and Kashmir of its autonomy, was carried out in defiance of United Nations Security Council resolutions and accompanied by mass detentions, communication blackouts, and a heavy military lockdown. India’s treatment of its Muslim minority, through discriminatory policies such as the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and the proposed National Register of Citizens (NRC), has drawn widespread international criticism for institutionalizing exclusion.

Crackdowns on dissent, curbs on press freedom, arrests of activists under draconian laws like the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA), and rising attacks on Christians, Dalits, and other marginalized groups all point to democratic backsliding at home.

Even beyond its borders, India has acted in ways that blatantly violate the very norms it claims to uphold. In 2023, Canadian authorities accused Indian agents of involvement in the assassination of Sikh leader Hardeep Singh Nijjar. Similar allegations of targeting Sikh activists have surfaced in the United States and Pakistan, where Indian operatives were reportedly involved in plotting attacks.

Extraterritorial killings and assassination attempts are not only unlawful under international law, but they also directly undermine the rules-based order India claims to champion. These actions place New Delhi alongside the very authoritarian states it claims to be morally distinct from.

The selective invocation of democracy thus reveals that principle is secondary to geopolitical expediency. India promotes democracy only when it strengthens its international leverage, whether to differentiate itself from China or to curry favor with Western capitals, while eroding the same values within its own borders and overlooking abuses abroad when convenient.

Multilateral forums also highlight this pattern. India has limited its engagement in platforms where Russia and China hold a greater role. During its SCO presidency in 2023, India hosted the summit online rather than in person, downplaying the forum’s significance. In 2024, it boycotted the summit in Kazakhstan, and in 2025, its defense minister refused to endorse the SCO communiqué. By contrast, New Delhi has actively deepened ties with Western-led initiatives such as the Quad.

Meanwhile, India has obstructed Pakistan’s entry into BRICS+, despite Russia’s support, belittling the very principle of inclusivity it often champions.

Consequently, these moves reveal a consistent pattern: India carefully navigates between Russia and the West, adopting international norms only when they align with its interests.

Its selective adherence, discouraging citizens from fighting abroad, importing Russian oil, diversifying arms purchases, invoking democracy to counter China, overlooking Israel’s aggression, repressing minorities at home, plotting against Sikh leadership abroad, and obstructing rivals in multilateral platforms, demonstrates that New Delhi’s commitment to the rule-based order is not rooted in principle but in convenience.

This duality would possibly downgrade its relations with Russia in the near future, and possibly, Pakistan may be an alternative in the region for Russia, as the reengagement between Pakistan and Russia is visible in recent developments.

The writer is the general secretary of the Consortium for Asia Pacific Studies in Pakistan and is pursuing his PhD in international relations from Selcuk University, Turkey.